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Abstract. This study aims to track insider trading activities prior to announcement of 
merger and acquisition deals in Istanbul Stock Exchange. 35 companies and 50 deals are 
examined for the period 2002 -2013 and significant average abnormal returns one months 
to twelve months prior to the dissemination of the related information are detected, 
indicating private information becoming public in some way. Abnormal price changes in 
M&A deals in Turkey may call for closer monitoring, stricter legislations and more 
cautious investors in the market. Significant returns are detected but no evidence regarding 
with sectorial differences are found in terms of information leakage. 
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1. Introduction 
ost of the time investors and funds don’t suffice with the risk free asset 
returns and they seek higher returns and take higher risks in security 
markets. However, they are cautious not to be below the security market 
line. Technical analysis, fundamental analysis and their ability to read the market 
may determine their success in a fair and an efficient market. 
However, an efficient market may be fair only when the material information is 
disseminated simultaneously. In other words, every investor shall have the equal 
chance to react to the new information released otherwise, as prices adjust to new 
information, an investor may miss an opportunity or incur losses. Insider 
information may help the ones who possesses it to trade earlier than remaining lot 
therefore it is forbidden in almost in every reputable market.  
Even if the most strict laws and regulations are in place, it may not be easy to 
detect insider trading by its nature. Investigations require time, effort, willingness 
and funding. Regulators may refrain from banning insider traders when they 
significantly contribute to the trading volume of the market in some cases. Despite 
these factors, it is obvious that insider trading is something that regulatory bodies 
shall fight against to build trust in the market. 
This study, aims to put forth that there are significant variances in returns of 
companies that have announced a merger and acquisition (M&A) deal which may 
be linked to information linkage but refrains from any sort of accusation for these 
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companies. This study has studied recent merger and acquisition deals in Turkey 
and aimed to trace possible insider trading prior to these deals. The main 
assumption of this study is that there is a significant relationship between abnormal 
returns prior to M&A deals and insider trading activities There many deals taking 
place in Turkey but they are mostly private deals. Their data are not available and 
are beyond the scope of this study. İnsider trading have other forms such as before 
making quarterly financials public but other forms of insider trading are also 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Academicians have sought heavily insider trading prior to M&A deals in option 
markets as these markets may be more convenient to circumvent particular 
regulations such as short selling. However, Turkish options market is at the 
emerging stage in terms of both depth and breadth therefore the possible 
information in options market are left out and beyond the scope of this study. 
Similarly, bankruptcy filings and insider trading relationship is beyond the scope of 
this study due to the present strict short selling requirements and insufficient option 
volume in the market.  
The information should be material and information related with financials, 
expected profit or losses, financial difficulties, change in dividend policies, legal 
issues, issue of new securities and M&A deals are regarded as material 
information. According to the decision of Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey 
on 14.07.2011, chairman and members of the board, managers, auditors, other 
employees of the firm, people who may be informed about the material information 
by the nature of their profession or duty, and, people who may be in contact with 
these people directly or indirectly. 
 
TABLE 1. Sectoral Merger and Acquisition totals in Turkey between 2002-2013 (Million$) 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Energy 139,8 163 674 4.822 1.187 682 5.718 1.362 16.728 443 6.968 5.979 
F&B 198,5 387 30 154 868 765 - 802 287 3.178 1.983 288 
FinancialServ. 108,3 30 232 4.806 11.448 6.331 2.394 264 6.381 680 4.534 1.679 
Cement 46,9 - - 945 908 - 1.076 265 - - - - 
Automotive 37 - 27 - 202 - - - - - - - 
IT 5,6 - - - - 422 - - - - - - 
PetroChem. - 184 85 - - 2.040 - - - - - - 
Durables - 159 - - - - - - - - - - 
Retail - 154 - 576 - - 2.062 - - 559 - 989 
Pharma. - 63 - - 311 612 - - - - - - 
Mining - 44 266 186 59 - - 385 - - 286 - 
Paper - 29 - - - - - - - - - - 
Textile - 21 48 - 25 - 228 - - - - - 
Service - - 614 130 77 - - 108 - - - - 
Tourism - - 367 642 213 352 - - 922 - - - 
Leather - - 32 - - - - - - - - - 
Ceramics - - 85 - - - - - - - - - 
Telecommun. - - - 12.690 650 - - - - - - - 
Aluminum - - - 350 - - - - - - - - 
Port Services - - - 940 127 - - - - - - - 
MediaEntert. - - - 824 833 1.472 232 - 165 452 - 556 
Iron-Steel - - - 3.039 42 - - - - - - - 
Infrastructure - - - - 463 - - - - - - - 
Malls - - - - 422 - - - - - - - 
Manufacture - - - - 100 - - 140 156 887 457 831 
Isolation - - - - 171 - - - - - - - 
AirportManag. - - - - - 6.650 - - - - - - 
Real Estate - - - - 113 1.223 495 - 437 - 502 308 
Production - - - - - 650 1.954 - - - - - 
Shipping - - - - - 3.043 382 - 441 - - - 
Construction - - - - - - 676 - - - - - 
Health - - - - - - 554 294 - 1.712 838 - 
Transportation - - - - - - - - - 2.354 6.914 2.563 
Source: (Ernst & Young) 
 
Table 1 indicates that energy, food and beverage and financial service sectors 
attract the attention of market players almost every year. Each year top three 
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sectors that have enjoyed the highest investment amount in terms of merger and 
acquisition are bolded.  Transportation sector, interestingly, have had significant 
deals in the last three years whereas, there were no deals recorded earlier. Media, 
manufacture, cement, real estate, and health sector have also had changes in their 
market structure. The rest of the sectors have had deals but they seem more extra 
ordinary. 
 
TABLE 2. World Wide Announced Merger and Acquisitions (Billion$) 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Deals Worth Deals Worth Deals Worth Deals Worth 
America 12.569  1.097.178  12.800  1.234.909 12.582  1.204.407  11.812  1.230.241 
Europe 15.853  643.356  16.036  711.763 14.274  783.009 12.540  547.625 
Africa- 
M. East 
1.160  81.207  1.139  47.495 1.356  62.190 1.069  80.699 
Asia-
Pacific 
10.891  480.134  10.212  444.318  9.536  408.014  9.274  454.638 
Japan 2.182  94.812 1.887  106.813  2.030  85.081 2.124  80.093  
Total 42.655  2.396.689  42.074  2.545.300  39.779  2.542.703 36.819  2.393.298  
Source: (Thomson Reuters Mergers and Acquisition Report, 2013) 
 
In Table 2, it is apparent that there is no significant change in any region and 
they almost preserve their share throughout the period. Europe has the highest 
share, America and Asia- Pacific Countries also have substantial shares however, it 
is interesting to note that Africa and Middle East are almost half of Japan which is 
almost out of picture. The majority of the Mergers and Acquisitions take place in 
Eurozone, America and Asia- pacific and there is no recent interest in Middle East. 
Some of the mergers and acquisitions are conducted by foreign firms and by 
intuition, they may seem more valuable compared to deals among national firms. 
Geographical differences may play a role in moving prices or in terms of 
dissemination of material information but number of data are not sufficient yet to 
make a meaningful analysis for Turkish case.  This table shows us that an M&A 
deal is a rare phenomenon that may easily be used to reap profits by insiders. 
 
TABLE 3. Horizontal, Vertical and Mix Mergers Approved by Competition Board in 
Turkey between 2002 and 2013 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Horizontal 28 26 42 47 45 67 51 56 11 108 121 134 
Vertical 5 9 22 15 28 27 39 35 59 75 67 
Mix 1 1 1 1 5 6 4 17 67 5 6 17 
Total 34 36 65 63 78 100 94 108 137 188 194 151 
Source: Competition Board, 2013 
 
Competition Board has a vital role in approving the deals in a merger process. 
Any information that may leak from the approval process may be material and 
constitute a source for insider traders therefore utmost precaution shall be taken 
when disseminating such information. Table 3 indicates that number of horizontal 
mergers have increased significantly recently and potential for insider information 
has increased. There may be other possible sources of information leakages such as 
higher circles in the acquiring firms or the firm being acquired. Here, it is 
important to differ insider information and the information that may be derived 
from rationing as mosaic theory points out.  
 
2. Literature Survey 
There are numerous studies regarding with mergers and acquisitions in the 
literature however, studies working with its linkage with insider trading is 
relatively scarce. Augustin, Brenner and Subrahmanyam (2014) have investigated 
the movements in equity options prior to M&A announcements. They provide 
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evidence that insider traders who have private information enjoy substantial 
positive returns after the date of announcement. They have used trading volumes, 
excess implied volatility and bid-ask spreads as indicators of insider trading.  
Chesney, Crameri and Mancini (2011) provide empirical evidence that insider 
trading is present in the options market prior to particular events such as the take 
overs of AIG and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, the collapse of Bear Stearns 
Corporation and public announcements of large losses or write downs. They report 
that hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of profits are realized via insider 
trading. 
Some deals are financed by cash and some are financed by external debt. 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) show evidence that deals financed with cash  
have relatively higher abnormal returns. Augustin et al, (2014) has shown that 
cash-deals have 6.37 % more cumulative abnormal volume than non-cash financed 
deals during the month before the announcement date.  
Ge, Humphery-Jenner and Lee (2014) have examined bankruptcy filing 
announcements and insider trading relationship. Even though, they fail to find a 
significant relationship, they point out the fact that liquidity decreases substantially 
when there is a bankruptcy possibility. Thus, even if investors have a private 
information, they may have hardship in converting that information into cash. 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) have indicated that information leakage is highly 
possible in M&A deals even in the US markets. Their sample was composed of 
101 shares listed in New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange and 
93 shares that are traded over the counter. They have provided evidence that insider 
trading activities occur 12 days prior to announcements. Stricter laws and 
regulations have passed since than therefore this period may have been diminished 
and it may be analyzed in another study. 
A much broader and recent study is conducted by Chan, Ge and Li (2012) 
regarding with M&A deals. They have examined the period of 1996-2010 with a 
sample of 5,099 events and 1,754 firms. They conclude that informed option 
trading measures prior to announcements have a significant predictive power on 
the M&A acquirer announcement return. Moreover, they have stated that the 
predictive power is strengthened if the option is relatively more liquid than the 
stock traded. 
Regarding with regulations, Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has been 
eager to pursue insider trading enforcement actions and international trading 
activities are also taken into considerations in recent times. (Lehtman & White, 
2013). The authors point out the importance of policies and procedures especially 
when the information is price sensitive; training programs regarding with insider 
trading; and finally firms should be able to know what to do when there is to a 
cross-border regulatory investigation. 
Knewtson and Nofsinger (2014) has the analyzed the end user of insider 
information. They provide evidence that CFO-based trading portfolios enjoy higher 
returns compared to CEO-based insider trading portfolios because CFOs has the 
ability to exploit information more fully than CEOs. 
Archarya and Johnson (2010) show evidence that suspicious trading activity is 
positively related to number of investors in that particular deal. They have not 
found significant relation between target size and returns prior to deals but they 
have found a significant relation with target size and volume before deals.  
Early researches that study Istanbul Stock Exchange claim that there are no 
significant abnormal returns after the acquisition or merger dates and when there 
are, they are only for a short period of time, namely within 5 days around the 
announcement day, it is possible to achieve abnormal returns (Yörük and Ban, 
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2006).  Tanyeri and Hekimoglu (2011) point out that in the three day period around 
the announcement day, target firm shareholders enjoy an cumulative abnormal 
returns of 8.56 % in mergers and 2.25 % in partial acquisitions. No research aiming 
to detect insider trading in ISE prior to M&A deals is found. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Data is composed of 35 companies and 50 M&A deals for the period 2002- 
2103. For each incident; 1 month, 3 month, 6 month and 1 year returns prior to 
announcement dates are calculated. Secondly, average monthly, quarterly, semi-
annually and annual returns are calculated for that particular firm prior to the 
particular announcement date. For each sector, insider trading may be the case 
when the former returns vary significantly from the latter. Normality tests and 
variance analysis is done by STATA. The hypothesis are as follows: 
Ho: there is no significant difference between average period returns and pre-
announcement returns. 
H1: there is significant difference between average period returns and pre-
announcement returns. 
When H0 is rejected, than, insider trading may be speculated. Statistically 
significant period returns may give an idea regarding with the timing of the insider 
trading activity. 
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Where, 
Rjt is the observed return for the particular period and µRjt is the average period 
return and sjt is the standard deviation for the particular period. Significance of z-
scores are test for significances 10%, 5% and 1 %. sjt is calculated from the 
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4. Findings 
Turkish market has been segmented into five sectors for analysis which are 
namely the finance sector, food sector, energy sector, media and entertainment 
sector and service sector. Each company under study is clustered into one sector 
and analyzed separately. The aim was to seek differences among sectors and timing 
of insider activities. 
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TABLE 4. Returns prior to announcements of the Finance Sector 
Prior returns 1 year 6 months 3 months 1 month Acquisition rate% 
1 Türk Ekonomi Bankası -0,2222 0,1371 -0,0132 -0,0549 100 
2 Ak Sigorta  -0,1571 -0,2876 -0,1827 0,0000 31 
3 Akbank 0,0182 -0,2432 0,2174 0,0120 20 
4 Yapı Kredi  0,5944 0,4548 -0,0965 -0,0463 57,4 
5 Denizbank - Zorlu Holding 1,4870 0,3619 0,2017 0,0142 74,99 
6 Denizbank - Dexia 0,7067 0,3602 0,3602 0,1564 99,85 
7 Alternatif Bank 0,5505 0,8370 0,4696 0,2336 70,84 
8 Şekerbank 0,0000 -0,2945 -0,3312 0,0553 33,98 
9 Garanti Bankası 0,0477 0,2500 0,0348 -0,1140 25,5 
10 İş Yatırım -0,3456 -0,2124 -0,0918 -0,0532 31,57 
 
Finance sector exhibits significant changes in the prices of shares 3 to 12 
months prior to announcement dates in Aksigorta, Akbank and Şekerbank cases 
whereas the last month was significant in Garanti Bankası case. The highest 
significance is with Alternatif Bank but it is worth to note that each of the deals had 
had significant returns prior to announcements. 
 
TABLE 5. Analysis of Finance Sector 
Z-scores and significance 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year 
T. Ekonomi Bankası -3,7885 *** -2,2384 ** -0,5911 -5,3408 *** 
Ak Sigorta -0,2548 -6,6171 *** -6,7839 *** -1,8924 * 
Akbank -0,2817 3,2518 *** -9,9523 *** -1,2770 
Yapı Kredi  -3,1734 *** -4,4388 *** 1,9262 * 1,3018 
Denizbank-Zorlu Holding -5,2038 *** -3,0313 *** -9,9179 *** -0,0003 
Denizbank-Dexia 6,8576 *** 8,5315 *** 3,2274 *** 4,7076 *** 
Alternatif Bank 14,0691 *** 15,8401 *** 19,2584 *** 4,5232 *** 
Şekerbank 0,6686 -8,3555 *** -6,7637 *** -3,5022 *** 
Garanti Bankası -6,0859 *** -1,7088 * 1,5405 -1,0353 
İş Yatırım -4,1204 *** -4,7748 *** -6,7128 *** -8,0306 *** 
*** %99, ** %95, * %90 
 
TABLE 6. Returns prior to announcements of the Food Sector 
Prior returns 1 year 6 months 3 months 1 month 
Acquisition 
rate % 
11 Anadolu Efes -0,0265 -0,0456 0,0115 0,0329 100 
12 Gözde Girişim Sermayesi 1,5749 0,4828 0,3738 0,1846 39 
13 Kiler Alışveriş Hizmetleri   -0,5250 -0,1003 0,2052 -0,0212 100 
14 Migros  -0,0980 0,1288 0,4488 -0,0515 100 
15 Ülker Gıda  0,2315 0,0310 -0,0859 0,0000 100 
16 Ülker Gıda  0,2441 -0,0541 -0,0948 -0,0367 78,2 
17 Migros  0,3631 0,1088 0,0700 0,0190 70,77 
18 Bizim Toptan 0,1589 0,0679 -0,0132 0,0170 100 
19 Gözde Girişim Sermayesi 0,1385 0,0989 -0,1065 0,0816 100 
20 Ülker Gıda  0,8196 0,5293 0,1386 0,0177 12,3 
 
Food sector exhibits significant changes in the prices of shares throughout the 
year before the announcement dates. There is no clear picture in food sector. This 
may arise from the fact that sometimes there are negotiations among firms 
regarding with deals and there is uncertainty at the same time. Significant negative 
returns are reversed in the following months as in Kiler’s case or significant 
positive returns are given back in the following months as in the second Ulker’s 
case.  
Insiders lack the ability to short sell in the Turkish market as short selling orders 
are alerted on screens and have to be reversed back within the day. Thus, a 
negative information on prices have less value to a positive information in this 
market. But still they may liquidate a position earlier than others which may be a 
breach and material.  
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TABLE 7. Analysis of Food Sector 
Z-scores and significance 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year 
Anadolu Efes 2,2724 ** 0,0737 -1,3729 -1,0595 
Gözde Girişim  2,9017 *** 3,4951 *** -7,0703 *** -0,0003 
Kiler Alışveriş Hizmetleri  1,1283 11,5101 *** -14,7006 *** -20,0000 *** 
Migros -2,7042 *** 15,0089 *** 3,0644 *** 0,4927 
Ülker Gıda  -0,5208 -4,8224 *** -0,5236 7,8354 *** 
Ülker Gıda  -3,7596 *** -4,6056 *** -2,0891 ** 10,8205 *** 
Migros  0,3101 0,5181 1,2729 6,1979 *** 
Bizim Toptan 0,9944 -2,1017 ** 1,2563 7,0725 *** 
Gözde Girişim  1,9431 * -8,0681 *** -2,8350 *** -4,7551 *** 
Ülker Gıda  0,6978 6,4951 *** 14,4565 *** 11,5294 *** 
*** %99, ** %95, * %90 
 
TABLE 8. Returns prior to announcements of the Service Sector 
Prior returns 1 year 6 months 3 months 1 month 
Acquisition 
rate % 
21 Gözde Girişim Sermayesi 0,0305 0,0411 -0,1383 0,0492 48,81 
22 İş Girişim Sermayesi  0,2000 0,0286 0,0189 -0,0137 20 
23 Tav Havalimanı Holding 0,3780 0,0571 0,0176 -0,0211 100 
24 Trakya Cam  -0,4791 -0,5353 -0,2866 -0,2000 100 
25 Boyner Mağazacılık  -0,1990 0,0368 0,4091 0,2551 63 
26 Arçelik  -0,7536 -0,6352 0,0759 -0,0058 100 
27 Doğuş Otomotiv  -0,0397 -0,0833 -0,0242 -0,1769 100 
28 Gözde Girişim Sermayesi 1,0645 0,9277 -0,1281 -0,1645 67 
29 Tav Havalimanı Holding 0,1813 0,1456 0,0974 -0,0048 38 
30 Netaş Telekomünikasyon  2,3538 1,9727 0,1978 0,1978 100 
 
Boyner had a highly significant positive return one month prior to 
announcement date. Netaş enjoyed returns throughout the previous year of the 
announcement date with even higher significance. The deals Gözde Girişim, 
Trakya Cam, Doğuş Otomotive and second deal of Gözde Girişim had significant 
negative returns that may indicate information leakage. Investors that had the 
shares seems like they have timely abandoned the shares. 
 
TABLE 9. Analysis of Service Sector 
Z-scores and significance 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year 
Gözde Girişim Sermayesi -19,9130*** -16,7802*** -5,4742*** -6,7673*** 
İş Girişim Sermayesi  -1,2254 1,1306 1,3727 8,6133*** 
Tav Havalimanı Holding -2,2477** -0,1180 0,3113 7,7383*** 
Trakya Cam -11,0315*** -8,3850*** -11,2139*** -7,5745*** 
Boyner Mağazacılık  12,5590*** 10,4861*** -1,8186* -5,5309*** 
Arçelik  -0,7513 1,5567 -11,0072*** -8,1495*** 
Doğuş Otomotiv  -12,7773*** -2,4291*** -5,1202*** -7,0709*** 
Gözde Girişim  -10,0404*** -6,7100*** 7,0718*** 0,0002 
Tav Havalimanı Holding -0,7736 4,0420*** 3,4772*** 0,9426 
Netaş Telekomünikasyon  10,5544*** 3,3696*** 30,2906*** 21,7781*** 
*** %99, ** %95, * %90 
 
TABLE 10. Returns prior to announcements of the Energy Sector 
Prior returns 1 year 6 months 3 months 1 month 
Acquisition 
rate % 
31 Demir Döküm  -0,2808 -0,1343 -0,1262 -0,1652 72,56 
32 Petrol Ofisi-OMV Holding 0,1138 0,8716 0,3301 0,3866 95,72 
33 Petkim -0,1623 -0,2008 -0,1732 -0,1116 25 
34 Tüpraş 0,8017 0,2440 0,2222 0,0773 51 
35 Afyon Çimento -0,4157 -0,0459 -0,1510 -0,0756 51 
36 Aygaz -0,0524 -0,1242 0,0833 0,1556 100 
37 Doğan Holding  -0,4057 -0,4750 -0,2588 -0,0308 52 
38 Doğan Holding  0,5039 0,0778 0,2357 0,0157 88,36 
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39 Akfen Holding -0,1004 0,0489 0,4345 0,0663 40 
40 Doğan Holding -0,3333 0,4118 0,0000 -0,1325 99,99 
 
Energy sector is one of the most interesting sector to examine in terms of 
abnormal returns. Acquisition of Petrol Ofisi, Aygaz and Akfen indicate 
information leakages based on our assumption. In the remaining deals that are not 
promising from the investors point of view for any reason, are sold in each period 
under study indicating information is not kept confidential. 
 
TABLE 11. Analysis of Energy Sector 
Z-scores and significance 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year 
Demir döküm  -7,7263 *** -4,8768 *** -5,5342 *** -6,8283 *** 
Petrol Ofisi - OMV Holding  19,8938 *** 11,5153 *** 21,9563 *** 3,9633 *** 
Petkim  -7,7881 *** -7,5832 *** -5,8254 *** -0,9436 
Tüpraş  1,9477 * 5,8834 *** 5,0805 *** 10,6463 *** 
Afyon Çimento  -5,1604 *** -6,3122 *** -3,7074 *** -7,0673 *** 
Aygaz  20,4158 *** 8,9539 *** -1,9092 * 7,6055 *** 
Doğan Holding  -2,3409 *** -8,7376 *** -12,1877 *** -9,8888 *** 
Doğan Holding  -1,0366 2,8628 *** -3,0322 *** -1,0553 
Akfen Holding 5,9112 *** 19,7895 *** 11,3478 *** -0,0037 
Doğan Holding  -8,8148 *** -0,8404 13,5529 *** -6,6214 *** 
*** %99, ** %95, * %90 
 
TABLO 12. Returns prior to announcements of the Media and Entertainment Sector 
Prior returns 1 year 6 months 3 months 1 month Acquisition rate % 
41 Doğan Yayın Holding -0,5035 -0,6502 -0,3364 0,1094 100 
42 Hürriyet Gazetecilik  -0,4663 -0,4181 -0,2897 -0,1004 99,99 
43 Doğan Yayın Holding  -0,8766 -0,7261 -0,6780 -0,3529 9,8 
44 Doğan Yayın Holding  -0,3115 0,0347 0,0982 0,0347 100 
45 Adel Kalemcilik  0,9291 0,1956 0,0149 0,2197 50 
46 Doğan Holding 0,7101 0,5526 -0,0167 0,1028 100 
47 Dagi Yatırım Holding  0,3082 -0,1938 -0,0714 -0,1186 12 
48 Doğan Gazetecilik  -0,1838 -0,0563 0,0000 -0,0793 22 
49 Doğan Holding  -0,5351 -0,4301 -0,1719 0,0192 99,99 
50 Doğan Yayın Holding  0,0032 -0,3804 -0,3319 -0,4306 19,99 
 
Media and entertainment sector resembles the other sectors in terms of 
significant returns. Adel Kalemcilik had a highly significant return one month prior 
to the announcement whereas, Dogan Yayın Holding had significant returns before 
almost all of the announcements. Here negative announcement expectations might 
have brought additional sales to this company and might have contributed the 
significance of returns. 
 
TABLE 13. Analysis of Media and Entertainment Sector 
Z-scores and significance 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year 
Doğan Yayın Holding 4,3197 *** -7,9678 *** -11,6072 *** -9,1784 *** 
Hürriyet Gazetecilik  -4,7599 *** -7,7641 *** -8,5000 *** -8,5402 *** 
Doğan Yayın Holding  -13,5999 *** -14,0838 *** -11,8893 *** -13,8419 *** 
Doğan Yayın Holding -0,3333 -1,2594 -2,6928 *** -6,9802 *** 
Adel Kalemcilik  13,7820 *** -2,2070 ** 1,0688 10,1725 *** 
Doğan Holding 6,1202 *** -1,9042 * 12,8359 *** 7,8658 *** 
Dagi Yatırım Holding -8,0557 *** -4,2369 *** -6,4578 *** 4,6876 *** 
Doğan Gazetecilik -4,7706 *** -0,9639 -2,5215 *** -4,2197 *** 
Doğan Holding  1,1225 -6,4368 *** -9,6493 *** -3,0267 *** 
Doğan Yayın Holding  -13,8515 *** -6,9434 *** -9,9772 *** -2,5426 *** 
*** %99, ** %95, * %90 
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5. Conclusion 
Information leakage is an international problem that deteriorates the belief in 
markets that already have hardship in attracting investors. Apparently, M&A deals 
are a good source to obtain insider information in Istanbul Stock Exchange and 
information seems to be obtained twelve to one month in advance before the 
announcement date.  
Strict regulations or discouraging penalties may play a role in predating the 
transactions as insiders may believe they may avoid investigations this way. There 
may be other factor in the abnormal variation in prices of shares that have an 
announcement to make regarding with M&A deals they have experienced but 
prices seem like adjusting to the information before the announcement dates which 
is a clear breach of trust and duty against small investors. Penalties shall be stricter 
and regulators may closely monitor trading activities 6 to 12 months prior to 
announcements. 
İt is hard to say insider trading changes from sector to sector but it is a problem 
to fight with in general. Discouraging penalties may help investors to refrain from 
such activities but monitoring foreign investors and penalizing them may be a 
challenge for Turkish regulators in the coming terms. 
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